Polish ultimatum for Lithuania

The relations between Poland and Lithuania in the period between the wars were really specific. Despite the fact that they were widely discussed – they officially did not exist. In March 1938 however, there was a breakthrough…

At night between 10th and 11th March 1938 an incident with far-reaching consequences took place on the Lithuanian – Polish border near Marcinkonys village. Two soldiers from the Border Protection Corps (Polish Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza, KOP), Stanisław Wolanin and Stanisław Serafin were sent to patrol the border. At about 5 AM they came across a civilian who was escaping from the Polish to the Lithuanian side and they tried to stop him. When they started shooting towards the mysterious person, Lithuanian frontier guards, who unexpectedly appeared there, started shooting at them. As a result of sudden shooting, Serafin was wounded. Despite the fact that the Polish side demanded that Lithuanians should leave the injured man, since the Lithuanians had numerical superiority, they loaded him on a vehicle and they drove away to Lithuania. Later findings proved that between the moment of shooting the soldier and the time of giving him help, 1.5 hour passed. Why the course of events of that morning has turned out to be so important? It was not the first border incident between Lithuania and Poland. It quickly turned out that the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to use the death of the Polish soldier as a pretext to regulate the relations between the two countries. This is why on the 13th March 1938 at 2 PM, on the border bridge in Dymitrówka Lithuanian guards heard that “the case will be handled by the Polish government.”

Two arguing nations

From the very beginning of the existence of the Second Republic of Poland the relations between the two former nations of the Republic were as bad as they could be. The Polish diplomats were trying to change the situation, but the initial condition of Lithuanian people was that Vilnius, the historical capital, was to be given back to their country. For Poland, it was a demand that was impossible to fulfil. Secret meetings and discussions became more intense in 1933. Tadeusz Katelbach went to Kaunas as a private emissary of Józef Piłsudski. At the beginning he was doing well in overcoming the lack of trust of Lithuanian elite, with time however the resistance against the agreement with Warsaw became more intense again and between 1936 and 1937 the atmosphere between the two countries became ice cold. The criterion of mutual relations was the situation of minorities – Polish minority in Lithuania and Lithuanian one in Poland. On both sides there were persecution, limitation of rights and various revenge actions.

Finding a common starting point for both sides was so difficult that practically it was impossible. Poles wanted a clear declaration from Kaunas about willingness to regulate the mutual relations, whereas adversaries from the other side of the border were waiting for obvious gestures, clear concessions. There were voices saying that regulating the relations with Poland was not good for the Lithuanian interest. The small country was afraid of Polish cultural and economic influence, which would, in the opinion of some Lithuanian nationalists, “disturb the consolidation of the Lithuanian nation”, and in future even threaten its biological existence. From the perspective of Warsaw, the problem was seen a bit more pragmatically. It was not the most important problem of the Polish international policy, however, it was important, because it was limiting Polish possibilities in terms of the Baltic Region policy. This, in turn was threatening or even cancelling real chances of introducing the so-called Intermarium plan, supported by Józef Piłsudski and, after his death, by Józef Beck. It was also important that the development of north-east regions of Poland was significantly slowed down because of the “dead” Lithuanian border. Between 1937 and 1938 once more there appeared hope for some kind of agreement between Poland and Lithuania. Because of virtual lack of diplomatic relations between Kaunas and Warsaw, negotiation took place on the informal level, private one. The matters were going so well that it could be expected that the private conversations could become international ones soon. The situation in Europe, which was becoming more and more tense, worked in favour of it as well – Lithuanians with growing concern were thinking about the future of the Klaipeda Region, inhabited mainly by German people, which could soon become an object of the demands of the Third Reich. The matter was closed by the decision of Lithuanian dictator, the president Antanas Smetona, who said he was against further negotiations.

Sudden and unexpected breaking of the negotiations made the worst possible impression in Warsaw, especially since Polish emissaries were already in Gdańsk, were further, official conversations were to take place. When on 4^th March 1938 Józef Beck was talking to his deputy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jan Szembek, he described the Lithuanian case as unresolved and he said that he would continue dealing with it again after coming back from a visit he was to pay in Italy. He did so.

Brisk under-secretary

On 12^th March 1938 in the morning Jan Szembek was informed about the accident that took place on the Lithuanian border and about the death of Stanisław Serafin. Since the Minister was not present in Warsaw, the decision of the Polish under-secretary of foreign affairs turned out to be crucial for the further course of events. He thought that the case was serious and he called Edward Rydz-Śmigły, the General Inspector of the Armed Forces. He presented to him the text of the press announcement prepared earlier and commented the case, at the same time discussing the potential importance of the measures taken. The Marshal approved the content of the announcement, in which it was said, among other things, that the accident in which a Polish soldier was a victim had the character of a trap prepared by the Lithuanian authorities and that the government reserved itself a right to take a stance after a careful investigation of the matter, which is required by the seriousness of the event. These two fragments of the announcement were exceptionally problematic.

Above all, on the basis of what was established in the case of the death of Serafin it could not be said that there was any trap prepared by Lithuanian for Poles, but at most that it was transporting a Lithuanian agent over the border. The announcement clearly and groundlessly ascribed hostile intentions to Lithuanians. The second part of the announcement was a subject of discussions between Szembek, Rydz-Śmigły and the Prime Minister Felicjan Sławoj-Składkowski, which took place on 12^th March at night. The Marshal pointed out that if everything was going towards holding someone responsible, then it would have to be really done. Considering the fact that the investigation was not ended yet, it was difficult to unambiguously tell whose fault was it. Thus, the General Inspector of the Armed Forces decided to “soften” the announcement by adding that “further investigation is still in progress”. It was supposed to weaken the impression that Poland was willing to take the matters further. Maybe even to use force. When Szembek came back to the Ministry, it turned out that it was too late for making any changes in the content of the announcement. On the 13 March 1938 in European newspapers the announcement of the Polish Telegraphic Agency appeared. The impression was huge. It was even greater since the day before the army of the Nazi Germany annexed Austria.

Leader, guide us…?

When in Polish and European newspapers information about the sharp Polish announcement appeared, people looked at Warsaw. The leader of the Polish international policy, Józef Beck, was still absent in Warsaw, though. Despite everything that happened he decided not to shorten his visit in Italy and he was supposed to come back from Rome in the morning on 16^th March 1938. He approved the measures taken by Szembek in the cooperation with the Prime Minister and the Marshal Rydz-Śmigły but he did not take any further decisions.

Meanwhile in Poland there was a growing avalanche of anti-Lithuanian mood. Stanisław Cat-Mackiewicz wrote years later that it was Beck (…) who touched the cord of the Polish patriotism and compassion for the compatriots at the other side of the border (…). On the basis of the patriotic right of Poles, newspapers followed the mood.  Although it does not seem sensible to blame Józef Beck for increasing the anti-Lithuanian mood, still, undeniably it dominated the political discourse of that time. As early as on 13^th March the governmental “Gazeta Polska” wrote about the bandit attack of Lithuanian Police on the Polish Border Protection Corps. The National Democracy’s press’ stance was even stricter. “Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy” wrote about Stanisław Serafin as a victim of blind hatred and it stated that Poland is shocked by the assassination of the Polish soldier made by Lithuanians. According to the report, the national youth, during meetings organised then, unhesitatingly posed aggressive demands, among others to march to the Baltic Sea, and the above-mentioned Mr Cat-Mackiewicz, the editor of the Vilnius “Słowo” magazine, entitled one of his texts in March 1938 “We want normalisation of Polish-Lithuanian relations as compensation for Austrian Anschluss”. The ambiguity of his opinions was rightly pointed out by the central “Nowa Prawda”, which commented: “Shortly speaking, Mr Cat intends to fight Lithuania”.

The temperature in the country was rising fast. Meetings, marches, pickets were organised. People loudly demanded taking further steps and, at the same time, resolving once and for good the problem of Lithuanian-Polish relations. The Minister Józef Beck came back to the country to this situation.

Józef, the successor of Józef

On 16^th March 1938 in the afternoon, a conference about the Lithuanian-Polish conflict was organised in the Royal Castle in Warsaw. Since the morning of that day Beck was quickly collecting information, which was needed to prepare the plan of further action. In the context of Polish balance policy related to the two totalitarian powers, the Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, their attitude was crucial for the further steps that were to be taken by the Polish diplomacy. Soon, in turned out that Moscow did not want to risk the stable, though relatively cold relations with Poland just to become engaged in the Lithuanian-Polish conflict. Aware of the fact that the Soviet Union “was not going to move” Beck contacted the Polish ambassador in Berlin, Józef Lipski. He passed the information that the government of the Third Reich has only slight interest in Lithuania that boils down to Klaipeda, which meant that Warsaw had a free hand in that matter.

It is worth emphasizing that there was no possibility of Polish-German cooperation in both matters – the mentioned Austrian Anschluss and the Polish attempts to resolve the conflict with Lithuania. It was good for Germany, though, to encourage Poland to more serious diplomatic measures taken against Kaunas. It could change a bit the unfavourable impression made in Europe by the Anschluss, and also, potentially increase the international isolation of the Republic of Poland, which in such a situation might want to develop closer relations with Germany. It was especially important because of the already lessened Polish-French alliance. The determined and independent steps taken by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs irritated the French diplomats, and they did not bother to hide the irritation. Having such information, Beck went to the Royal Castle, where the decision concerning further steps against Lithuania was to be made. The President, the General Inspector of the Armed Forces and members of the government met there. Opinions on the further action were different. According to various reports, the creator of Gdynia, the deputy prime minister Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski and the President Ignacy Mościcki were advising moderation, but there also were people, who voted for posing far-reaching demands, such as that Lithuania should officially and ceremonially give up its claims related to Vilnius. Beck himself had the opinion that making an ultimatum is inevitable, and at the same time it should be stated in a very general form. The leader of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was aware of the fact that there was no real possibility that Poland could use force. Eventually, he got what he wanted.

The note with the ultimatum that was sent to the Lithuanian government was formulated in the morning on 17^th March 1938. It was established that it will be passed in Tallinn, where the Polish emissary Wacław Przesmycki was to hand it in to the emissary of the Republic of Lithuania, Bronius Dailidė . It took place at 10 PM (time in Tallinn), according to the instructions made in Warsaw. The content of the note was as follows:

On the instruction of my Government I have the honour to communicate Your Excellency what follows:
1.The proposal made by the Lithuanian Government on the 14^th day of the present month cannot be accepted, since it does not give enough guarantee of the safety of the border, especially after the failure of all the attempts of Polish-Lithuanian negotiations that have taken place.

2. In relation to this, the Polish Government announces that in its opinion the only way in which the situation can be resolved and which is serious enough in the context of the case is establishing normal diplomatic relations immediately, without any prerequisites. It is the only way of regulating the matters between the neighbours for each of the Governments, which of course have the good will to avoid events that could be dangerous for peace.

3. The Polish Government decided to give 48 hours to the Lithuanian Government, counting from the moment of handing in the note, to accept the proposal described above, but the accreditation of diplomatic representatives in Kaunas and Warsaw could not take place later than until 31^st March of the present year. Until then, all technical agreements or other agreements between the Polish and Lithuanian governments would be made between the Emissaries in Tallinn. The exchange of attached notes relating to the establishment of diplomatic relations will have to take place before the mentioned period of 48 hours in Tallinn between the Polish and Lithuanian Emissary.

4. The above proposal cannot be an object of discussion regarding the content or form. It is a ne varietur proposal. Lack of response or any additions or reservations will be regarded by the Polish government as a refusal.

In this negative case the Polish government will use its own means to protect the interest of its country.

The answer was to come on 19^th of March, the birthday of Józef Piłsudski.

Having Lithuanian over a barrel

The ultimate note of the Polish government had a more or less general form, but it was not changing the fact that it was an unprecedented means of pressing the Kaunas government. Lithuanians were afraid of Polish military intervention. The French diplomacy informed Warsaw about this. In spite of it, the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to investigate the attitude of Berlin, Moscow and Parish which, as it was believed, could in some way soften the sharp Polish stance.

The only state which, in a discreet way, showed its support for Lithuania was the Soviet Union. The people’s commissary of international affairs Maksym Litwinow has emphasized it, when he pronounced an announcement for the Polish ambassador in Moscow, Wacław Grzybowski. He said that he hoped for a peaceful solution for the problem. The remaining countries tried to persuade Vilnius to accept the Polish ultimatum, and Latvia was especially prominent here.

18^th and 19^th of March were nervous days. A wave of anti-Lithuanian manifestations was going through Poland, inspired by the Camp of National Unity, which was using the help of the National Radical Camp “Falanga”. To emphasize the determination of the Polish side, armed forces were gathered near the Lithuanian border, and the Marshal Rydz-Śmigły came to Vilnius to give a proud speech. On the streets of Kaunas, on the other hand, people were uneasy. Lithuanian government newspapers were printing the government’s announcement to the nation:

Lithuanian people! Sons and daughters of the noble and just nation! Surprised, you will read an announcement about demands presented to your government by the Polish one. In this serious hour, the Motherland and the future of the holy Lithuania need your absolute peace. Our attitude is clear and unanimous for us.

Feverish consultations of Lithuanian politicians could not produce any alternative scenario. Lithuania was left alone in the conflict with a stronger neighbour, manifesting its readiness for a military action.

On 19^th March 1938 at 12 (Estonian time) in Tallinn there was an exchange of notes, which finished the resolving of the political crisis between Kaunas and Warsaw. The death of the Polish soldier, Stanisław Serafin, turned out to be a good pretext to establish diplomatic relationship between the Second Republic of Poland and the Republic of Lithuania. Kaunas accepted the demands of Warsaw.

***

The ultimatum did not prove a to be a good sing for the future, and it did not initiate a fast growing friendship. Only neighbours benefited from the mutual antagonism. On 28^th October 1939 the Lithuanian military forces entered Vilnius, devastated earlier by Soviets. Less than two years after the events of March 1938 none of the countries existed on the map. Lithuania and other Baltic countries belonged to Soviets.

Initially the text has appeared here: http://histmag.org/Polskie-ultimatum-wobec-Litwy-7700

Source: http://pl.delfi.lt/kultura/kultura/polskie-ultimatum-wobec-litwy.d?id=60893155

Tłumaczenie Emilia Zawieracz w ramach praktyk w Europejskiej Fundacji Praw Człowieka, www.efhr.eu. Translated by Emilia Zawieracz within the framework of a traineeship programme of the European Foundation of Human Rights, www.efhr.eu.